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THE RIGHT OF TERMINATION IN
COPYRIGHT LAW: THE SECOND CIRCUIT'S
DECISION IN PENGUIN GROUP (USA) INC. V.
STEINBECK BODES WELL FOR AUTHORS
Michael A. DeLisa *
Recently, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit decided in
Penguin Group (USA) Inc. v. Steinbeck that a new agreement made by
an author's surviving spouse may supersede the author's previous
copyright grant, and consequently extinguish the right of the author's
other heirs to reclaim the copyright through the invocation of a
statutory termination right. Section 304(c) of the Copyright Act of 1976
permits publishers to hold the copyright granted to it by authors for the
statutory period, after which time the author or the author's heirs may
terminate the original grant and recapture the copyright. However, an
author's termination right under section 304(c) applies only to grants
made prior to January 1, 1978. Authors may not terminate grants that
are made on or after this date. But what happens when an author
grants a copyright before January 1, 1978, and subsequently, the
author's surviving spouse enters into an agreement to re-grant the
copyright after this date? Has this subsequent agreement extinguished
the section 304(c) right of termination? In Penguin Group, the Second
Circuit held that this subsequent agreement superseded the prior pre-
1978 grant and extinguished the statutory termination right of the
author's other heirs. However, this decision should not be perceived as
a defeat for copyright holders. Indeed, the ability and prerogative to
consent to the extinguishment of their statutory termination right should
be perceived as an enormous bargaining chip that authors and their
heirs can use in their subsequent negotiations with publishers.
* J.D. Candidate, May 2010, Loyola Law School Los Angeles; B.A., University of Miami.
I would like to thank the editors and staff of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review for their hard
work on this Comment. A special thanks to Bryan Swatt, Professor Jay Dougherty, and Sabina
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I. INTRODUCTION
One quality that makes copyright such a unique form of property
is that "unlike real property and other forms of personal property, [it]
is by its very nature incapable of accurate monetary evaluation prior
to its exploitation."' Thus, an author just beginning her career
commonly contracts with a publisher for terms that are not
advantageous (and for a comparatively small sum) because of the
unknown potential of her work. If the work later proves to be hugely
successful, the publishing company receives a windfall, and the
author (and her heir) loses the opportunity to reap the benefits of her
creativity. In part to address this problem, section 304(c) of the
Copyright Act of 1976 permits the publisher to hold those rights
granted to it until a statutory period expires, at which time the author
(or her heirs) may exercise a termination right that allows her to
terminate the original grant and recapture the copyright.'
The author's termination right under section 304(c) applies only
to grants "executed before January 1, 1978." 3 Thus, authors may not
terminate grants made on or after January 1, 1978.4 A problem arises
when the following scenario occurs: an author makes an original
grant of rights to a publisher before 1978, and later, after the author's
death, the author's surviving spouse or heirs re-grant those rights in a
subsequent post-1977 agreement with the publisher. The issue then
becomes whether the post-1977 agreement supersedes the original
grant, thereby extinguishing the section 304(c) right of termination.
The Southern District of New York's decision in Steinbeck v.
McIntosh & Otis, Inc.5 was notable because the court held that a
subsequent agreement between John Steinbeck's widow and the
publisher could not supersede and extinguish the Steinbeck heirs'
right of termination.' Recently, however, the district court's decision
was reversed and remanded by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
1. 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 9.02 (2006).
2. See 17 U.S.C. § 304(c) (2006); Mills Music, Inc. v. Snyder, 469 U.S. 153, 172-73
(1985) ("[T]he termination right was expressly intended to relieve authors of the consequences of
ill-advised and unremunerative grants that had been made before the author had a fair opportunity
to appreciate the true value of his work product.").
3. 17 U.S.C. § 304(c) (emphasis added).
4. See id. Grants or agreements made on or after January 1, 1978 are sometimes referred to
as "post- 1977" grants or agreements.
5. 433 F. Supp. 2d 395 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
6. Id. at 401.
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Second Circuit in Penguin Group (USA) Inc. v. Steinbeck.7 In
Penguin Group, the appellate court held that a new agreement (made
by an author's surviving spouse) can in fact supersede a prior grant,
thus extinguishing another heir's right to reclaim a copyright through
the invocation of a statutory termination right.8
The Second Circuit's decision in Penguin Group resulted in a
dramatically different resolution as compared to the holding in a
recent Ninth Circuit case that was based on a similar set of facts. In
Classic Media, Inc. v. Mewborn,9 the court concluded that a
subsequent, post-1977 agreement made by an author's heir did not
extinguish that heir's right of termination because such an agreement
was an inconsequential "agreement to the contrary." "
At first glance, the Second Circuit's holding in Penguin Group
seems like it will have a negative effect on the rights of authors'
heirs. '" The perception is that this holding could allow publishers to
take advantage of an author's heirs by executing unfair post-1977
agreements which would extinguish the heirs' right of termination. 2
The assumption is that by giving publishers the ability to extinguish
authors' termination rights by making agreements with unsuspecting
heirs, the case allows publishers to unfairly circumvent the very
purpose of section 304.
The actual implication of this ruling, however, does not have
such an impact. Rather than giving publishers an opportunity to
make unfair agreements with authors' heirs, this case shifts the
bargaining power to authors and their heirs when they are making
subsequent agreements with publishers. Indeed, the ability and
prerogative to consent to the extinguishment of their right of
termination is an enormous bargaining chip that authors and their
heirs can use in their negotiations with publishers for subsequent
agreements.
7. 537 F.3d 193 (2d Cir. 2008).
8. See id. at 204.
9. 532 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2008).
10. Id. at 986; see 17 U.S.C. § 304(c)(5) (2006) ("Termination of the grant may be effected
notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary .... ).
11. See Posting of Eriq Gardner to THR, Esq. (Aug. 13, 2008 19:28 EST),
http://reporter.blogs.com/thresq/2008/08/federal-appeals.html (referring to the Penguin Group
holding as reversing a decision that many legal observers viewed as a victory for authors against
publishers).
12. See id.
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Part II of this Comment explains the statutory background of
section 304(c) and discusses the factual background that led to the
Second Circuit's decision in Penguin Group. Part III describes the
Second Circuit's reasoning in deciding that a surviving spouse's
subsequent agreement to re-grant rights may extinguish the
termination rights of other heirs. Part IV discusses the case of Classic
Media, Inc. v. Mewborn "3 and the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of
section 304(c). Finally, Part V distinguishes Penguin Group from
Classic Media and discusses the decision's positive implications for
authors.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Statutory Background of Section 304(c)
The subject of termination rights presents difficult issues for
Congress in its attempt to "secur[e] for limited Times to Authors...
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings." " Congress created
termination rights in the Copyright Act of 1976. 15 A right of
termination enables an author or the author's successors to terminate
previous grants of copyrights and renegotiate prior contracts to more
accurately reflect the current true value of the work. 16 However,
under the Copyright Act of 1976, previously transferred copyrights
do not revert automatically; they revert to the author only upon her
affirmative exercise of her right of termination. 17
This right of termination was intended to avoid the injustice that
had arisen under the Copyright Act of 1909. Because the Copyright
Act of 1909 did not provide any termination rights, publishers were
able to pressure new authors into assigning all future renewal rights
when signing their first publishing contract. 8 There are three
13. 532 F.3d 978.
14. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
15. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
16. See Music Sales Corp. v. Morris, 73 F. Supp. 2d 364, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
17. See 17 U.S.C. § 304(c) (2006); see also Roxanne E. Christ, Milne v. Slesinger: The
Supreme Court Refuses to Review the Ninth Circuit's Limits on the Rights of Authors and Their
Heirs to Reclaim Transferred Copyrights, 14 UCLA ENT. L. REv. 33, 35 (2007) (stating that
"[t]ermination is not automatic" under the Copyright Act of 1976).
18. Under the Copyright Act of 1909, the copyright's life was divided into an initial term of
twenty-eight years and a renewal term of twenty-eight years. Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No.
349, § 23, 90 Stat. 1075, 1080 (1909) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.);
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provisions of the 1976 Act that provide termination rights: section
203(a), section 304(c), and section 304(d). These three termination
provisions outline the transfers (or grants) that are subject to
termination, when termination rights may be exercised, and who may
exercise these rights. 19 Section 304(c) uses the date the copyright
was secured to determine the period during which termination rights
may be exercised.2" For grants executed before 1978, termination
may be effected under section 304(c) "at any time during a period of
five years beginning at the end of fifty-six years from the date
copyright was originally secured, or beginning on January 1, 1978,
whichever is later." 21
Congress created termination rights to protect new artists and
authors when granting their copyright to a publisher because they did
not know how successful their work would be in the future.22 On the
other hand, termination rights pose a threat to transferees (such as
publishing houses) because transferees can be forced to give up their
rights in an author's work when the author effectively exercises her
right of termination.23 In an effort to elude this threat, transferees
often enter into post-transfer agreements with a surviving spouse or
heir of the author to preclude the author's future heirs from
exercising their right of termination. 24  After this post-transfer
see 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 1, § 11.07 ("Sadly the Supreme Court largely undermined
effectiveness of the [1909 Act] renewal structure .... The culprit was Fred Fisher Music Co. v.
M. Witmark & Sons, which held that renewal rights may be assigned prior to their vesting....
[T]o avoid a similar emasculation of the termination provisions, the current [1976] Act provides
that '[t]ermination of the grant may be effected notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary,
including an agreement to make a will or to make any future grant."' (quoting 17 U.S.C.
§§ 203(a)(5), 304(c)(5) (footnote omitted)).
19. Section 203(a) addresses the termination of transfers executed on or after January 1,
1978. Sections 304(c) and 304(d) address the termination of transfers executed before 1978 of
works still under copyright on January 1, 1978. In Penguin Group (USA), Inc. v. Steinbeck, 537
F.3d 193 (2d Cir. 2008), section 203(a) did not apply because the initial transfer was executed in
1938. Section 304(d) was not yet enacted at the time the pertinent facts of Penguin Group
occurred. Therefore, this Comment will exclusively deal with section 304(c).
20. 17 U.S.C. § 304(c)(3).
21. Id.
22. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 124 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5740
("[The termination provisions were necessary] because of the unequal bargaining position of
authors, resulting in part from the impossibility of determining a work's value until it has been
exploited.").
23. See 17 U.S.C. § 304(c).
24. See, e.g., Penguin Group, 537 F.3d at 196 (publisher enters into agreement with author's
widow); Classic Media, Inc. v. Mewbom, 532 F.3d 978, 980-83 (9th Cir. 2008) (publisher enters
into agreement with author's heirs).
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agreement, if another heir of the author attempts to serve the
transferee with a notice of termination, the notice of termination is
arguably invalid.25
The Copyright Act of 1976 distinguishes between pre-1978
grants and grants made during or after 1978.26 Because of this
distinction, transferees in this situation argue that the author's heir
has effectively surrendered statutory termination rights by executing
a non-terminable post-1977 agreement that replaced a previously
terminable pre-1978 agreement.27  However, Congress made
termination rights inalienable by inserting language into the statute
explicitly stating that termination "may be effected notwithstanding
any agreement to the contrary."2 8 Some authors' heirs interpret this
provision to mean that their pre-1978 termination rights cannot be
affected by a post-1977 agreement with the transferee. 29 Thus, court
battles between authors' heirs and transferees have thus far focused
on the statutory interpretation of section 304(c)(5) of the Copyright
Act and whether a post-1977 agreement constitutes an "agreement to
the contrary" under this section.
B. Factual Background
Penguin Group 31 involved Nobel and Pulitzer Prize-winning
author John Steinbeck and the right of termination of his copyrighted
works. In 1938, Steinbeck made a transfer of rights (the "1938
Assignment") to a predecessor of Penguin Group, which covered
several important works including Tortilla Flat, Of Mice and Men,
The Red Pony, and The Grapes of Wrath.3' Later when Steinbeck
died in 1968, his widow, Elaine Steinbeck, and his two sons from a
previous marriage statutorily inherited his right of termination. 2
25. See Classic Media, 532 F.3d at 981.
26. Transfers of an author's copyright executed by anyone other than the author are subject
to termination only if executed prior to 1978. 17 U.S.C. § 304(c) ("[A]ny copyright.. . executed
before January 1, 1978, by [an author, author's surviving spouse, or statutory heir] ... is subject
to termination ... ").
27. See supra note 26 and accompanying text; Steinbeck v. Mcintosh & Otis, Inc., 433 F.
Supp. 2d 395,401 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
28. 17 U.S.C. § 304(c)(5) (emphasis added).
29. See Steinbeck, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 402 n.23.
30. Penguin Group (USA) Inc. v. Steinbeck, 537 F.3d 193 (2d Cir. 2008).
31. Steinbeck, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 399 n.12.
32. Id. at 399.
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Elaine inherited 50 percent of the termination right, and Steinbeck's
two sons, Thomas and John IV, inherited 50 percent. 33
John IV died in 1991, leaving his share of the termination right
to his only surviving child, Blake Smyle. 34 In 1994, Elaine35 entered
into an agreement (the "1994 Agreement") with Penguin Group in
which Penguin Group retained the same rights of publication that it
held under the 1938 Assignment but at an increased price.36
Furthermore, the 1994 Agreement stated that "when signed ... [it]
will cancel and supersede the previous agreements . . . for the
[works] covered hereunder."37
Upon Elaine's death in 2003, Thomas and Blake possessed all of
Steinbeck's termination interest.38 In 2004, Thomas and Blake
notified Penguin Group of their intention to terminate the 1938
Assignment, and Penguin Group asserted that the notice was
invalid. 9 Penguin Group argued that the 1994 Agreement, by its
express terms, canceled and superseded the 1938 Assignment,
effectively transforming Steinbeck's pre-1978 grant into a new grant
of copyright, executed "on or after January 1, 1978." 4" Therefore,
Penguin Group asserted that the 1938 Assignment was not subject to
termination under section 304.4"
III. REASONING OF THE COURT
A. Whether the 1994 Agreement Superseded
the 1938 Assignment
The Second Circuit found that the language of the 1994
Agreement made clear that the parties intended to terminate the 1938
33. Id. at 399-400. Section 304(c)(2)(B) states that a deceased author's termination right is
to be divided as follows: 50 percent to his widow and the remaining 50 percent to his children and
grandchildren. 17 U.S.C. § 304(c)(2)(B).
34. Steinbeck, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 400.
35. Elaine Steinbeck possessed the power of attorney to exercise the Steinbeck descendants'
termination rights as a result of a separate 1983 settlement. Penguin Group, 537 F.3d at 203 n.5.
36. Steinbeck, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 401.
37. Penguin Group, 537 F.3d at 196.
38. Steinbeck, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 400.
39. Id. at 401.
40. Id.
41. Id.
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Assignment. 4 2 The court reasoned that a contract remaining in force
may still be terminated and renegotiated in exchange for one party's
forbearance of its legal right, such as a statutory right to terminate a
previous grant of copyright.4 3 Additionally, contract law provides
that once terminated and superseded, the new contract provides all of
the parties' obligations and remedies for breach." Thus, the court
concluded that the 1994 Agreement was the governing contract and
the 1938 Assignment was effectively superseded. 4
Among the evidence the court relied on for its conclusion was
the fact that both Penguin Group and the Steinbeck estate gained
benefits other than those originally granted under the 1938
Assignment.46 Specifically, the 1994 Agreement obligated Penguin
Group to pay larger guaranteed advance payments and larger
royalties.4' The 1994 Agreement also modified the geographic limits
of the publication rights to the works and imposed a requirement on
Penguin Group to keep a greater number of Steinbeck works in
print.48 In return, Penguin Group could continue profiting from its
publication of the Steinbeck works.
The court's central inquiry was not concerned with whether "the
parties [intended] to preserve [their termination] rights-which are
granted by statute, not contract-but rather their intent to terminate
the 1938 Agreement." 5 This is because "[t]he availability of
termination rights under the Copyright Act is not dependent on the
intent of the parties but on, among other things, the date that a grant
of right was executed and the relationship to the author of those
seeking to exercise the termination right." 1
42. The 1994 Agreement stated that "when signed by Author and Publisher, [it] will cancel
and supersede the previous agreements, as amended." Penguin Group, 537 F.3d at 196 (alteration
in original).
43. Id. at 201.
44. Id. at 200. Congress stated that "nothing in [section 304] is intended to change the
existing state of the law of contracts concerning the circumstances in which an author may
terminate a license, transfer or assignment." H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 142 (1976), reprinted in
1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5758.
45. Penguin Group, 537 F.3d at 202.
46. Id. at 200-01.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 201.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
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The court further noted that nothing in section 304(c) prevents
the renegotiation of a prior grant where a notice of termination has
not been served. 5 2 This type of succeeding grant of rights presumes
the parties' knowledge that the holder of the termination right can
exercise that right if the parties fail to reach a new agreement.53
Since the court concluded that the 1994 Agreement terminated and
superseded the 1938 Assignment, it held that the 1994 Agreement
also eliminated the right to terminate the grants contained in the 1938
Assignment under sections 304(c) and (d). 14
B. Whether the 1994 Agreement Was an "Agreement
to the Contrary" Under Section 304(c)(5)
The court did not read the phrase "agreement to the contrary" so
broadly as to include every agreement that has the effect of
eliminating a termination right. " The court looked to the statutory
text and legislative history of the Copyright Act and observed that
there was no indication that elimination of a termination right,
through the supersession of a pre-1978 contractual grant, was
precluded or undesirable. 56 The court observed that the House Report
for the 1976 amendments to the Copyright Act noted that "'parties to
a transfer or license' would retain under the amendments the
continued right to 'voluntarily agree ... at any time to terminate an
existing grant and negotiat[e] a new one."'' 5 7 Moreover, the court
stated that nothing in the statute suggested that authors (or their
statutory heirs) were entitled to more than one opportunity to use
their termination rights. 58
IV. HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK
In another recent case, Classic Media, Inc. v. Mewborn, 59 the
Ninth Circuit reached a different conclusion from the one that the
52. Id. at 202.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 203.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 204 (stating that authors and their heirs had only one opportunity to exercise their
termination right regardless of whether the opportunity is taken to exercise ternination rights or
whether those rights are just used to enhance bargaining power).
59. 532 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2008).
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Second Circuit announced in Penguin Group. Like Penguin Group,
the issue in Classic Media was whether an heir's right of termination
could be superseded by a post-1977 agreement."6 However, Classic
Media held that termination rights remained intact and were not
superseded by an heir's subsequent agreement. 6
In Classic Media, 62 Eric Knight, author of the famous children's
story and novel Lassie Come Home was survived by his widow and
three daughters, who inherited the rights to the Lassie works. 63 In
1976, Winifred Knight Mewborn, one of Knight's daughters,
executed an agreement in which she assigned her share of motion
picture and television rights to Lassie Television, Inc. (the "1976
Assignment"). ' Two years later, Lassie Television obtained similar
agreements from Mewborn's two sisters.65 To conform the grant of
rights among all the sisters, Mewborn signed a subsequent agreement
on March 16, 1978 (the "1978 Agreement"), which contained an
identical transfer of rights as those contained in the 1976 Assignment
but also added language assigning ancillary rights to Lassie
Television. 66
The 1978 Agreement contained the following language: "The
rights granted herein to [Lassie Television] are in addition to the
rights granted by me to [Lassie Television] under ... an assignment
dated July 14, 1976 ...., In 1996, Mewborn served a notice of
termination, within the five-year period required by section 304(c), 68
on Lassie Television's successor-in-interest, Classic Media, Inc., to
terminate the 1976 Assignment, effective 1998.69 The court held that
60. Id. at 980-81.
61. Id. at990.
62. Id. at 978.
63. Id. at 980.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 980-81.
67. Id. at 981.
68. Section 304(c)(3) states, "Termination of the grant may be effected at any time during a
period of five years beginning at the end of fifty-six years from the date copyright was originally
secured, or beginning on January 1, 1978, whichever is later." 17 U.S.C. § 304(c)(3) (2006). In
this case, the original copyright was secured by Eric Knight in 1938. Classic Media, 532 F.3d at
980. The year 1994 is fifty-six years from 1938. Because 1994 is later than January 1, 1978, the
applicable five-year window during which Mewbom could have exercised her termination rights
began in 1994.
69. Classic Media, 532 F.3d at 981.
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Mewbom's post-1977 agreement could not extinguish her statutory
termination rights because "such a result would circumvent the plain
statutory language of the 1976 Act." 7
The court took particular notice of section 304(c)(5), which
states, "Termination of the grant may be effected notwithstanding
any agreement to the contrary . . . ."" According to the court, this
language "was intended to protect against attempted contractual
circumvention of the termination right."72 The court found that the
1976 Assignment was not substituted or revoked by the 1978
Agreement; thus, there remained a pre-1978 grant that was still
subject to termination. " The court further stated that even if the post-
1977 agreement superseded the 1976 Assignment, such an agreement
would be void as an "agreement to the contrary" under section
304(c)(5). 7"
V. ANALYSIS
Penguin Group and Classic Media differ on the issue of whether
a subsequent, post-1977 grant of rights constituted an "agreement to
the contrary" under section 304(c)(5) of the 1976 Copyright Act.
Section 304(c)(5) states, "Termination of the grant may be effected
notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary, including an
agreement to make a will or to make any future grant."' 76 The
examples-an "agreement to make a will" or "make any future
grant"-do not serve as an exhaustive list of the only instances that
constitute "an agreement to the contrary. ' 7  However, an overly
broad interpretation of this provision goes against the legislative
intent and statutory purpose behind section 304(c)(5).
70. Id. at 979-80.
71. 17 U.S.C. § 304(c)(5).
72. Classic Media, 532 F.3d at 985-86.
73. Id. at 986.
74. Id.
75. Penguin Group (USA), Inc. v. Steinbeck, 537 F.3d 193, 202 (2d Cir. 2008); Classic
Media, 532 F.3d at 986.
76. 17 U.S.C. § 304(c)(5).
77. See id. § 101 ("Except as otherwise provided in this title, as used in this title, the
following terms and their variant forms mean the following .... The terms 'including' and 'such
as' are illustrative and not limitative.").
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A. Distinguishing the Cases
Unlike the court in Penguin Group, the court in Classic Media
held that the subsequent agreement did not supersede and extinguish
statutory termination rights.78 However, Penguin Group can be
distinguished from Classic Media for two reasons. The first reason
has to do with whether or not the subsequent agreement was intended
to supersede the original grant of rights. The second reason considers
the statutory heirs' knowledge of their vested rights at the time of
negotiation.
First, in Classic Media, the subsequent agreement was not
intended to revoke or substitute for the original assignment of
rights.79  Instead, the original assignment remained intact.80
Conversely, in Penguin Group, the parties clearly intended the
subsequent agreement to terminate and supersede the original
assignment.81 Unlike Mewborn's subsequent agreement, which
explicitly stated that it granted rights "in addition to" the rights
granted in the original assignment,82 Elaine Steinbeck's subsequent
agreement expressly revoked the original 1938 Assignment.83
The second reason for distinguishing Penguin Group from
Classic Media is the fact that in Classic Media, there was no
evidence that Mewborn or the publisher considered Mewborn's right
of termination when they entered into the 1978 Agreement. 8 4 Indeed,
there was no evidence that Mewborn was aware of her termination
rights in March 1978, which was just two months after section 304(c)
became effective. 85 Moreover, at the time Mewborn was negotiating
the new agreement, she would not have had the right to serve a
78. Classic Media, 532 F.3d at 989-90.
79. See id. at 989 (finding no evidence to support the conclusion that Mewbom or Lassie
Television "considered Mewborn's termination rights ... or that Mewborn intended to waive or
relinquish them").
80. Id.
81. See supra Part LI.A.
82. Classic Media, 532 F.3d at 981.
83. Penguin Group (USA), Inc. v. Steinbeck, 537 F.3d 193, 200 (2d Cir. 2008).
84. See supra text accompanying note 79.
85. Mewborn signed the 1978 contract "as is" without the advice of counsel and without
negotiating any of its terms. See supra note 79.
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notice of termination until six years later. 86 Therefore, Mewborn
"had nothing in hand with which to bargain." 
87
In Penguin Group, the evidence suggested that Elaine Steinbeck
was fully aware of the termination rights she possessed. 8  Elaine
had-and more importantly, knew that she had-statutory
termination rights at the time she negotiated the new agreement.89
This enabled Steinbeck to leverage the possibility of copyright
termination to secure greater benefits for herself and the Steinbeck
heirs." ° The fact that Steinbeck knew she possessed vested
termination rights at the time of negotiation was crucial. Those
circumstances were absent in Mewbom's case.
Critics of the opinion in Penguin Group might point to the
Second Circuit case of Marvel Characters, Inc. v. Simon,9 in which
the court reached a conclusion similar to that in Classic Media.
However, as the Penguin Group court correctly demonstrated,
Penguin Group can be distinguished from Marvel Characters as
well.92 The facts of Marvel Characters involved a settlement
agreement that attempted to retroactively alter the positions of the
parties to a prior agreement."
Under section 304(c)(5), the two specific categories of grants
excluded from statutory termination are transfers made by will and
grants of works for hire. 9 4 In Marvel Characters, Joseph Simon
created the Captain America character in the iconic Captain America
Comics.95 In 1941, a predecessor in interest to Marvel Comics, Inc.,
acquired the rights to Simon's works." In 1969, Simon and the
publisher entered into a settlement agreement that categorized the
author's previous works as works done by an "employee for hire."97
86. Classic Media, 532 F.3d at 989.
87. Id.
88. See Penguin Group, 537 F.3d at 196.
89. See id. at 202 (stating that Elaine Steinbeck renegotiated the original grant of rights
"while wielding the threat of termination").
90. See id. at 200-01.
91. 310 F.3d 280 (2d Cir. 2002).
92. Penguin Group, 537 F.3d at 203.
93. See id.
94. 17 U.S.C. § 304(c)(5) (2006).
95. Marvel Characters, 310 F.3d at 282.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 283-84.
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This designation rendered termination rights unavailable under
section 304(c)(5). 98
Marvel Characters presented a situation that clearly goes against
the legislative purpose of section 304. The Second Circuit agreed
that the author's acknowledgement that he created the works "for
hire" was clear and unambiguous, but nevertheless found that fact
irrelevant.99 Instead, the court relied on the language and legislative
purpose behind section 304(c). 100 The court interpreted that the
legislative purpose was to grant an inalienable right to terminate
"notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary." 101
The court stated that not finding this to be an "agreement to the
contrary" would allow a litigation-savvy publisher to use its superior
bargaining position to compel authors to agree that their works were
created "for hire" as a condition of publication. 102 This ability would
render section 304(c) a nullity. "' Unlike the original assignment in
Marvel Characters, the original assignment in Penguin Group was
not being altered in any way. Instead, the termination of the original
assignment enabled the Steinbeck heirs to negotiate new and more
lucrative rights. 1"4
B. Implications
The U.S. Supreme Court, in Stewart v. Abend, "' does not
support a broad, plain-meaning interpretation of section 304(c)(5).
Some lawyers and judges interpret the Court's dicta that "[t]he 1976
Copyright Act provides . . . an inalienable termination right" 106 to
mean that termination rights cannot be superseded or extinguished by
any subsequent agreement. However, this interpretation is too broad.
Following this line of reasoning, virtually every subsequent
98. 17 U.S.C. § 304(c)(5).
99. Marvel Characters, 310 F.3d at 289.
100. Id. at 289-91.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 290-91.
103. Id.
104. See Penguin Group (USA), Inc. v. Steinbeck, 537 F.3d 193, 200-01 (2d Cir. 2008)
(reasoning that the new agreement obligated Penguin Group to pay larger guaranteed advance
payments and royalties, and imposed a requirement on Penguin Group to keep a greater number
of Steinbeck works in print).
105. 495 U.S. 207 (1990).
106. Id. at 230.
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agreement could be rendered an "agreement to the contrary," and the
incentive for publishers to bargain with authors would be eliminated.
Therefore, by not finding the widow's subsequent agreement in
Penguin Group to constitute an "agreement to the contrary," 107 the
Second Circuit provides publishers with an incentive to negotiate
more lucrative deals for authors' heirs prior to the exercise of a
statutory copyright termination.
According to the court in Marvel Characters, the language of
section 304(c)(5) was intended to protect authors and their heirs
against a publisher's attempt to contractually circumvent their
termination rights. 08 However, Congress stated that "nothing in
[section 304] is intended to change the existing state of the law of
contracts concerning the circumstances in which an author may
terminate a license, transfer or assignment." '09 Therefore, authors
(and their heirs) should be able to contractually forfeit their statutory
termination rights. This is beneficial for the publisher because it can
protect its newly assigned rights. Furthermore, it is especially
beneficial for the author because her heirs obtain the power to
negotiate a more lucrative deal.
A basic principle of contract law is that where the parties have
clearly expressed or manifested their intention for a subsequent
agreement to supersede a previous agreement, the subsequent
agreement extinguishes the previous one. 11 Penguin Group
reaffirms this basic principle by ruling that termination rights are
inalienable but like most rights are still subject to contractual
relinquishment. "' By making it possible for termination rights to be
effectively relinquished, this decision allows authors' heirs to gain
substantial benefits through greater bargaining power when
renegotiating deals.
This contention is proven by the results of Elaine Steinbeck's
negotiation of the new agreement in Penguin Group. 11 Elaine
107. Penguin Group, 537 F.3d at 204.
108. See Marvel Characters, 310 F.3d at 290-91 (explaining that the "notwithstanding any
agreement to the contrary" language in section 304(c)(5) was included to avoid the result of
"provid[ing] a blueprint by which publishers could effectively eliminate an author's termination
right").
109. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 142 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5758.
110. See Perry v. Vanteon Corp., 192 F. Supp 2d 93, 96 (W.D.N.Y. 2002).
111. See Penguin Group, 537 F.3d at 202-04.
112. See id. at 196.
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Steinbeck was able to negotiate a far larger annual guaranteed
advance and increased royalties as a result of the bargaining power
her right of termination afforded her. 113 Elaine Steinbeck's choice to
use the leverage of imminent vesting to revoke the pre-1978 grant
and enter into a highly lucrative new grant of the same rights
"achieved the exact policy objectives for which section 304(c) was
enacted." 114
Another factor to consider here is that a publisher needs no extra
protection from Congress because a publisher often has the upper
hand in a bargain with an author. 115 Instead, Congress aims to protect
authors from being taken advantage of by publishers in a superior
bargaining position. 16 In situations like Penguin Group, authors'
heirs (or surviving spouses) are not disadvantaged during
renegotiations because they possess knowledge that the authors did
not have during their initial negotiations-the fact that their work is
indeed valuable. Moreover, these heirs are usually represented by
their own counsel in renegotiations. Penguin Group recognizes that,
in such instances, an author's surviving spouse or heirs do not need
to be protected from their own voluntary agreements.
Accordingly, termination rights have one primary effect: they
give authors' surviving spouse and heirs bargaining power that the
author did not have when the initial transfer of rights occurred. "7
When authors and their heirs can use the threat of their termination
rights as leverage in subsequent negotiations, they hold precisely the
bargaining power that Congress intended for them to have. 18 Most
works that have been exploited for decades generate more
predictable revenue streams. This information gives authors' heirs
more bargaining power when renegotiating a grant of rights.
113. Under the new 1994 Agreement, royalties were to be calculated as 10-15 percent of
retail, instead of wholesale, sales. Id.
114. See Classic Media, Inc. v. Mewbom, 532 F.3d 978, 987 (9th Cir. 2008).
115. See Marvel Characters, Inc. v. Simon, 310 F.3d 280, 291 (2d Cir. 2002).
116. See Music Sales Corp. v. Morris, 73 F. Supp. 2d 364, 371 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) ("The policy
behind the statutory creation of renewal rights and the heritability of those rights is to ensure an
opportunity for the author to reclaim the copyright of a work that s/he may have been forced by
hardship to sell during the work's first term for an unjustly small sum.").
117. Mills Music, Inc. v. Snyder, 469 U.S. 153, 172-73 (1985).
118. See Milne v. Stephen Slesinger, Inc., 430 F.3d 1036, 1046 (9th Cir. 2005) (stating that a
post-1977 agreement superseding a pre-1978 agreement was of "the type expressly contemplated
and endorsed by Congress" because it enabled an author's statutory heirs to renegotiate the terms
of an original grant with full knowledge of the market value of the works at issue).
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Therefore, subsequent deals between authors or their heirs and
transferees will be much more financially beneficial for the authors
and their heirs.
VI. CONCLUSION
By concluding that the subsequent 1994 Agreement was not an
"agreement to the contrary," the Second Circuit in Penguin Group
encourages authors' heirs to make similar agreements in the future
and thereby utilize their maximum bargaining power in
renegotiations with publishers. The legislative purpose behind
section 304(c) is clear-to give authors (including their surviving
spouse or heirs) a second chance to reap the financial rewards of
their successful creative work. "' Penguin Group advances this
purpose by permitting authors' heirs to use the increased bargaining
power conferred to them by the imminent threat of statutory
termination rights to enter into new, more advantageous agreements.
119. See Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 218 (1990).
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